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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
ON THE DOCKET 
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017) (Roberts, C.J.). 
Response by Andrew C. Michaels 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (Oct. Term 2016) 
Slip Opinion | Wired | SCOTUSblog 
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.: A Glib Rebuke of the Federal 
Circuit 
In Impression Products v. Lexmark,1 the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding 
that “a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, regardless 
of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the sale.”2 
Although the result is defensible, the Court does not offer much in the way of a nuanced defense. 
Instead, the Court simplistically harps on the theme that items in commerce should not be 
encumbered by restraints, failing to grapple with the fact that patents in general provide such 
restraints,3 and will continue to do so after the Court’s ruling. Patent exhaustion, to be sure, 
provides an important limitation or exception, but the Court’s reasoning would seem to swallow 
the rule. 
Legal Cloud–A Matter of Degree 
Reiterating its theme, the Court proclaims: “when an item passes into commerce, it should not be 
shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through the marketplace.”4 But as the Federal Circuit 
recognized, the legal cloud exists regardless, to some degree, because patent infringement is a 
strict liability offense, and various entities may own patents covering (or reading on) items in 
commerce.5 As discussed briefly at oral argument, there is generally no guarantee that all 
relevant patentees have sold (or authorized the sale of) all components to be found within any 
given item in commerce.6 
Consider the Court’s own illustration: a shop that restores and sells used cars. The Court states 
that the “shop can rest assured that, so long as those bringing in the cars own them, the shop is 
free to repair and resell those vehicles.”7 But to truly rest assured, the shop would also need to 
know that all owners of all patents covering any component of the car have sold or authorized a 
sale of that component. This could pose quite the epistemic challenge, particularly with more 
complex technologies, for as the Court recognizes, a “generic smartphone assembled from 
various high-tech components could practice an estimated 250,000 patents,”8 which may well be 
owned by various entities. 
The Court’s decision to strengthen the exhaustion doctrine does have the commendable 
advantage of lightening the legal cloud cast by patent rights. But the extent of the lightening 
remains unclear, and the impact will not be not as absolute as the Court suggests. 
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Remora-Like Patent Rights? 
A similar problem exists with the Court’s concluding coup de grace: “[a]llowing patent rights to 
stick remora-like to [an] item [sold by a patentee] as it flows through the market would violate 
the principle against restraints on alienation.”9 The Court’s reasoning proves too much; an item 
initially purchased from an unauthorized seller, flowing through commerce, would remain 
subject to “remora-like” patent rights. So could, even, an item purchased directly from a 
patentee, if other patents held by other entities also covered the item (or a component of it). The 
Court does not explain why such rights do not also violate the principle against restraints on 
alienation; that is, it does not explain why its reasoning applies in the exhaustion context but not 
outside of it. 
For example, if Lexmark had licensed a manufacturer to sell cartridges only for single use/no 
resale, the licensee could breach the license by knowingly selling to a purchaser that intended to 
reuse or resell the cartridges, and Lexmark’s patent rights would thus be unexhausted. But this 
would seem to be the case regardless of whether the purchaser knew of the licensee’s lack of (or 
limited) authorization, and furthermore, subsequent innocent purchasers of those cartridges could 
then still be sued for patent infringement, their innocence notwithstanding. 
Licensee Knowledge of Purchaser Intent 
Another difficulty raised by the Court’s opinion, following on the example of the previous 
paragraph, relates to sales by manufacturing licensees with limited authorization. Although the 
Court is somewhat ambiguous on this point, it appears that exhaustion in some cases may now 
turn on whether the licensee makes an unauthorized sale by knowingly selling to a purchaser 
who intends to violate the restriction by using the item outside of its scope. Discussing its own 
precedent of General Talking Pictures,10 the Court states: 
[T]he patentee could bring a patent suit against the purchaser only because the 
purchaser participated in the licensee’s infringement. General Talking Pictures, 
then, stands for the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given authority for 
a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s rights.11 
Where the licensee’s authority to sell is restricted, the licensee makes an unauthorized sale if it 
knows that the purchaser plans to use the item in prohibited ways. The difficult inquiry into the 
licensee’s knowledge of the purchaser’s intent is raised by the Court’s focus on the licensee 
seller’s authority to make the sale, as opposed to the Federal Circuit’s focus on the purchaser’s 
authority to infringe. 
The shift flows ultimately from the Court’s view that exhaustion is a limitation on the patentee’s 
35 U.S.C. § 154 rights to exclude, instead of an interpretation of the 35 U.S.C. § 271 “without 
authority” language, as the Federal Circuit had held.12 Under the Federal Circuit’s view, a 
purchaser from a restricted licensee, knowingly using an item outside the scope of the restriction, 
would lack “authority” and thus infringe, regardless of whether the seller knew of the 
purchaser’s intent to do so.13 
   
 
Conclusion–False Absolutism 
The Federal Circuit’s thorough en banc 9-2 majority decision deserved more credit than the 
Court’s reversal appeared to give. Perhaps realizing the likelihood of Supreme Court review, the 
Federal Circuit majority spent ninety-nine pages elucidating its thoughts, but its explanations 
appear to have fallen largely on deaf ears, with the Court glossing over some complexities. 
While the Court’s decision in Impression Products is defensible, its lack of sophistication makes 
the case seem easier than it was, unnecessarily sowing the seeds of potential future confusion. 
But of course, this sort of oversimplification is neither new, nor particularly unusual.14 
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